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a b s t r a c t 
We investigate the link between leadership, beliefs and pro-social behavior in social dilem- 
mas. This link is interesting because ﬁeld evidence suggests that people’s behavior in do- 
mains like charitable giving, tax evasion, corporate culture and corruption is inﬂuenced by 
leaders (CEOs, politicians) and beliefs about others’ behavior. Our framework is a repeated 
experimental public goods game with and without a leader who makes a contribution to 
the public good before others (the followers). We ﬁnd that leaders strongly shape their 
followers’ initial beliefs and contributions. In later rounds, followers put more weight on 
other followers’ past behavior than on the leader’s current action. This creates a path de- 
pendency the leader can hardly correct. We discuss the implications for understanding 
belief effects in naturally occurring situations. 
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 1. Introduction 
“Once you as a CEO go over the line, then people think it‘s okay to go over the line themselves.”
Lawrence Weinbach, Head of Unisys. (quoted after The Economist, July 27, 2002, p.58)
“… the most common argument legitimizing tax evasion among Swedes is that those in leading positions in society
violate the social norms.”
Hammar et al. (2009, p. 239 )∗ Corresponding author at: School of Economics, University of Nottingham, Nottingham NG72RD, United Kingdom. 
E-mail addresses: simon.gaechter@nottingham.ac.uk (S. Gächter), elke.renner@nottingham.ac.uk (E. Renner). 
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 Field evidence on charitable giving, tax evasion, the abuse of the welfare state, criminal behavior, corruption, and cor-
porate culture, suggests that people’s own behavior in these domains depends strongly on their beliefs about how others
will behave. 1 Leaders – politicians, government oﬃcials, and managers – may serve as role models for what is considered
appropriate and may thus shape their followers’ beliefs about the behavior of others. For instance, leaders who behave too
selﬁshly, evade taxes, consume unwarranted privileges, accept bribes, etc. may induce people to do the same (as suggested
by our opening quotes) and may nurture people’s beliefs that other people will do the same. This may exacerbate the prob-
lem to the extent that people’s behavior is not only shaped by the leader’s example but also by their beliefs about other
people’s actions. Of course, if the leader behaves as a positive role model, the opposite conclusions may hold. 
Our main contribution is testing this intuition. More generally, we aim to contribute to a better understanding how
leaders shape the beliefs of a group of people and their actual pro-social behavior. The framework for our analysis is the
public goods game, which is a well-known social dilemma that pits collective welfare against self-interest. We chose a public
goods context because the real-life problems that have inspired our research – tax morale, no corruption, high corporate
culture etc. – have features of a public good, which is undermined by selﬁsh acts of evading taxes, paying and accepting
bribes, and egotistic behavior at the workplace. 
Our speciﬁc setup is as follows. Four players, who form a stable group for ten rounds, make contributions to a linear
public good. Since we are interested in the link between beliefs and behavior we elicit beliefs of all players about how
much others will contribute. We will look at belief effects in two basic variations of the public goods game. In one version
(the ‘leader treatment’), one randomly chosen player is assigned to be the ‘leader’ who decides ﬁrst how much to contribute
to the public good. 2 , 3 The other players are ‘followers’ who decide simultaneously how much to contribute after they ob-
serve the leader’s contribution. A leader-follower framework has the advantage that we can observe how the leader’s action
inﬂuences followers’ beliefs. We contrast the leader treatment with a “no-leader treatment” in which all group members
decide simultaneously. 4 
How can leaders inﬂuence followers? There are two possible channels, which both rest on many people being con-
ditional cooperators who cooperate if others do so too (for evidence see the next section). The ﬁrst channel is a direct
channel according to which conditionally cooperative followers will match the leader’s contribution, at least to some de-
gree. The second channel opened up by conditional cooperation is via followers matching the beliefs about other follower’s
contributions, and these beliefs are likely inﬂuenced by the leader’s contribution and the followers’ previous contributions.
To investigate these channels, we estimate a belief-formation process that is inspired by Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) and
then we explain follower contributions as a function of follower beliefs and leader contributions. Our approach in the no-
leader treatment is analogous. 
Our main results are as follows. Leaders strongly shape their followers’ beliefs. In this sense, leaders are ‘role models’ and
‘belief managers’. While this holds in all periods, it is particularly important in early periods. In later periods, we ﬁnd that
the followers’ beliefs in a given period are not only determined by what the leader did in the present period but also by
what other followers did in the past. Moreover, when forming beliefs for the current period, followers put more weight on
average on the other followers’ past behavior than on the leader’s current behavior. This leads to a strong path dependency:
the leader’s initial behavior shapes the followers’ initial behavior and in later periods the followers’ behavior is not only
determined by the leader’s current contribution but also – and even more strongly – it is shaped by the other followers’
past behavior. Thus, if a leader initially contributed little, then this will have a long-lasting effect on the beliefs of followers
that is not easily corrected later on. 
Path dependency effects also exist in the no-leader treatment. Groups that start at high contribution levels have on
average higher overall contribution levels than groups that start out low. An explanation for this observation is that in
teams with no leader beliefs are shaped initially by the group members’ intuitive (‘homegrown’) beliefs and later on by the
followers’ past behavior. More importantly, contributions, for a given belief, are the same in both treatments: the same belief
triggers the same behavior. Yet, in the leader treatment it is in the hand of the leader to shape beliefs. 
We make three contributions to the literature. First, our two treatments provide simple frameworks for understanding
belief effects in reality: In some situations, beliefs are shaped by role models such as politicians, top oﬃcials, managers, or
even celebrities, whereas in the absence of leaders the behavior of the relevant group members inﬂuences beliefs. As we
will show in the next section, there is plenty of ﬁeld evidence that is consistent with belief effects. Yet, causal inferences
of beliefs on behavior are hardly feasible in the ﬁeld. Our experimental approach allows the observation of beliefs and
how leaders inﬂuence them. Thus, our experimental data provide a behavioral micro-foundation for ﬁeld observations that1 We will discuss the relevant evidence in the next section. 
2 We deliberately selected the leader randomly and anonymously, because we did not want to confound leader-induced belief effects with leader at- 
tributes, like status, persuasion, charisma, ability, superior information, power etc. These leader attributes certainly can matter strongly in reality. Our 
stripped-down leader-follower game measures only one aspect of leadership – leading by example. An investigation of other aspects of leadership or the 
impact of leader attributes requires different designs. For examples see Güth et al. (2007) , Van Vugt and Ahuja (2010) , Arbak and Villeval (2013) and 
Bruttel and Fischbacher (2013) . 
3 We focus on the role of leaders for cooperation . Of course, leaders are also important for coordinating behavior (e.g., Foss, 2001; Van Vugt and De 
Cremer, 2002 and Weber et al., 2001 ). Leaders are also often in a position to shape incentives in teamwork (e.g., Drouvelis et al., 2017 ). 
4 As we will see below, we are in particular interested in how leaders shape beliefs and action at the beginning of the leader-follower relationship. In 
a standard public goods game, players decide simultaneously about how much to contribute initially and they can thereby only rely on their homegrown 
beliefs. 
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 are consistent with presumed belief effects. Our main insight is that there is strong path dependency in behavior in both
treatments. In our view, the observation of path dependency contributes to an explanation of why it is so diﬃcult to ﬁght
corruption, tax evasion, and welfare fraud and why corporate cultures are hard to change. Once a norm of cooperation is
destroyed, leaders have a hard time re-establishing it because followers are more strongly impressed by their beliefs about
other followers than about the leader’s behavior. 
Second, by comparing belief effects in games with and without a leader we contribute to a better understanding of
determinants of voluntary cooperation. Existing experimental evidence (see next section) suggests that people contribute
on average more the more they believe others contribute. This observation implies that any factor that shifts beliefs will
shift behavior. Our leader-follower framework is suitable to test this implication because leaders are in a position to shift
follower’s beliefs. 
While our paper is not the ﬁrst in a ‘leading-by-example’ framework (see next paragraph), it is the ﬁrst to elicit leaders’
and followers’ beliefs about others’ contributions in a group context. The exception is Gächter et al. (2012) , who, however,
study pairs and elicit only leader beliefs. Eliciting both beliefs of leaders and followers allows us to understand better how
leading by example actually works and may thus contribute to further theory development. 5 
Finally, we place our paper in the broader literature that shares the characteristic of a leading-by-example framework in
social dilemma games. Some early papers comprise Moxnes and van der Heijden (2003) and Gächter and Renner (2003) .
Moxnes and van der Heijden are motivated by environmental problems and study a public bad with and without a leader.
Gächter and Renner investigate a public goods game with and without a leader, similar to the one we study here, but
without belief elicitation. Subsequent research investigated consequences of leader selection and motives of leaders. For
instance, Güth et al. (2007) are interested in the effects of ﬁxed vs. rotating leaders, with and without the power to ex-
clude followers. Haigner and Wakolbinger (2010), Rivas and Sutter (2011) and Arbak and Villeval (2013) compare volun-
tary and randomly-chosen leaders. Préget et al. (2016) study the link between preferences for conditional cooperation and
voluntary leadership. Further research questions also concerned the role of information asymmetries, communication, and
transparency. For example, Potters et al. (2007) study leading by example when returns from cooperation are privately or
publicly known. Houser et al. (2014) explore the consequences of how transparent the leader’s decisions are for followers’
cooperation. Levy et al. (2011) study how contributions suggested by human and computerized leaders inﬂuence follow-
ers’ contributions. The leading-by-example framework has also proved useful for a variety of other economically interesting
research questions. 6 None of these studies elicited beliefs. 
2. The importance of beliefs for pro-social behavior – evidence from the lab and the ﬁeld 
Here we discuss evidence from the ﬁeld and the lab that has inspired our research. Our focus is on evidence that beliefs
about others’ behavior matter for pro-social behavior. Economically important areas where belief effects might be relevant
are donations to charities, tax morale and abuse of the welfare state, corruption, criminal behavior, and corporate culture.
All examples have aspects of social dilemmas, which is why we model belief effects in a public goods game. We hasten to
add that for all ﬁeld examples discussed below belief effects are not the only factor at play; standard economic explanations
like correlated and contextual effects ( Manski, 20 0 0 ) are certainly important as well. 
With this caveat in mind, we start with charitable donations . In some fund-raising campaigns, it is common prac-
tice to list the names and donated amount on fund raising websites. 7 Donations by well-known politicians and celebri-
ties often feature prominently ( Kumru and Vesterlund, 2010 ). This observation suggests that fund raising organizers not
only rely on people’s feelings of altruism and compassion but also on belief effects: the or ganizers apparently think that
more people will donate if many others (and in particular prominent people) do so as well. Seed money effects ( List and
Lucking-Reiley, 2002 ) are a related phenomenon that at least in part exploits belief effects. 8 Consistent with belief effects,
Andreoni and Scholz (1998) report econometric evidence that charitable donations depend to some degree on other people’s
donations. 
Tax morale is another interesting case because taxes are typically used to ﬁnance public goods from which one beneﬁts
even if one has not paid taxes. Existing evidence suggests that, controlling for detection probabilities, people are less likely
to cheat on their taxes or to commit beneﬁt fraud if others behave honestly (e.g., Slemrod, 1992; Andreoni et al., 1998;
Scholz and Lubell, 1998 ). See Luttmer and Singhal (2014) for a more recent survey of relevant literature. In line with this
evidence Cowell (1990) argues: "a person’s propensity to dodge taxes seems to be strongly affected by the number of other
people who are already doing the same" (p. 108). 5 Previous theoretical papers on leadership and leading by example include, e.g., Bianco and Bates (1990), Rotemberg and Saloner (1993), Hermalin 
(1998), Arce (2001) , and Komai et al. (2007) . However, while the above-cited experimental papers explain leading by example at least in part by non-selﬁsh 
reciprocal motivations, these theoretical studies all give (different) rational (or evolutionary) accounts of leadership under the selﬁshness assumption. For 
an explanation of leading by example in terms of inequality aversion see Huck and Rey-Biel (2006) . 
6 For example, Drouvelis and Nosenzo (2013) explore the interaction of leading by example and group identity. d’Adda et al. (2017) investigate how the 
ethical conduct of a leader impacts on the ethical conduct of a group of followers. Loerakker and van Winden (2017) study leading by example in a contest 
game. 
7 See, for example, http://www.justgiving.com . 
8 Many theoretical and experimental studies that investigate leadership effects in charitable donations use public goods games as we do in this paper. 
See, e.g., Vesterlund (2003) , Andreoni and Petrie (2004) , Potters et al. (2005) and Kumru and Vesterlund (2010) . 
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 Frey and Torgler (2007) provide empirical evidence for the relevance of belief effects for tax morale. They use data from
the European Values Survey and conduct a multivariate analysis across 30 countries. Controlling for a host of variables Frey
and Torgler ﬁnd a positive correlation between people’s tax morale (measured by a question whether cheating on taxes is
justiﬁed if you have the chance) and people’s perception how many others cheat on taxes. 9 
While attitudinal data provide some insights, more recent research focuses on actual compliance behavior. A prominent
example is Fellner et al. (2013) who study compliance with paying TV license fees. In a natural ﬁeld experiment in Austria,
the enforcement authority sent letters to inform people believed to be evaders of their need to pay TV license fees. Some
letters manipulated social information about the number of compliant people. Their result is that compliance after receiving
the letter is higher when people believe evasion is common than when they believe it is rare. If people have heterogeneous
priors, a piece of information such as how many people are compliant, can have a positive effect on those who are positively
surprised (that is, whose prior beliefs about other peoples’ compliance was too pessimistic) compared to those who are
negatively surprised (that is, people who held an optimistic prior belief compared to actual compliance). Such reactions are
consistent with the idea that beliefs about others’ compliance matter for own compliance. 
Hallsworth et al. (2017) present a natural ﬁeld experiment in the UK, sending letters to people who are late with their
tax payments. Letters that contain messages about the addressee being in a minority of late payers compared to a high
number of on-time fellow citizens are particularly effective in speeding up payments of tax liabilities (compared to other
interventions not specifying minority status or a high number of compliant fellow citizens). This ﬁnding suggests that peer
effects matter for tax morale (see also Luttmer and Singhal (2014) who discuss peer effects as one channel of tax morale).
As Hallsworth et al. (2017) also point out, details of wording seem to matter strongly. This observation is consistent with
Fellner et al. (2013) who ﬁnd limited evidence on the effectiveness of simply referring to a high number of compliant people.
An interesting further observation is that tax morale in various countries is also affected signiﬁcantly by the behavior
of ‘leaders’ – recall the opening quotes. In their discussion of the literature on tax morale, Luttmer and Singhal (2014) also
describe reciprocity as one possible channel of tax morale. For example, tax morale is positively correlated with trust into
the government (e.g., Scholz and Lubell, 1998 ). 
The cited studies look at tax morale measured by variables such as how justiﬁed it is to cheat on taxes. These studies do
not investigate determinants of perceptions regarding how many other people cheat on taxes. The study by Hammar et al.
(2009) is a notable exception. Their main ﬁnding is that distrust in politicians increases perceived tax evasion. 
Belief effects may also matter for corruption, criminal behavior and public disorder . Corruption may be more prevalent the
more people think other people are corrupt ( Klitgaard, 1988; Huang and Wu, 1994; Fisman and Golden, 2017 ). Similarly,
people are more likely to commit crimes if they think criminal behavior is widespread ( Kahan, 1997 ). For instance, on the
basis of data from forty US-American cities, Skogan (1990) shows a positive relationship between public disorder and crim-
inal behavior. At a less dramatic scale, in an ingenious experiment conducted on a parking lot, psychologists Cialdini et al.
(1990) demonstrate that people are much more likely to throw away a ﬂyer (attached to their cars by the experimenters) if
the parking lot appears littered; if it is clean, people litter signiﬁcantly less (see also Keizer et al. (2008) ). In a cross-societal
experiment involving 23 countries, Gächter and Schulz (2016) ﬁnd that dishonesty (measured in an anonymous die-rolling
task) is strongly correlated with the prevalence of rule violations (corruption, tax evasion, political fraud) in the respective
society. The explanation for these phenomena is that people react sensitively to signals about what they believe is consid-
ered ‘normal behavior’ in a speciﬁc social setting. 
Psychologists have long argued that people’s cooperation behavior depends on what others do (e.g., Kelley and Stahel-
ski, 1970 ). Many people are ‘conditional cooperators’ who cooperate if others cooperate and free ride if others free ride.
Using the methodology of experimental economics, Keser and van Winden (20 0 0) were among the ﬁrst economists to argue
for the prevalence of conditional cooperation. Croson (2007) went one decisive step further by eliciting beliefs about other
group members’ contributions. She ﬁnds a very high and statistically signiﬁcant correlation of beliefs and contributions:
Subjects who expect others to contribute a lot are more likely to contribute high amounts than subjects who expect others
to free ride. Neugebauer et al. (2009), Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) , Gächter and Renner (2010) and Dufwenberg et al.
(2011) also ﬁnd a highly signiﬁcantly positive relationship between beliefs and contributions. Finally, experiments with the
‘strategy method’, where people make contribution decisions for all possible average contribution level of other group mem-
bers, ﬁnd strong evidence for conditional cooperation. 10 
The behavioral relevance of conditional cooperation has also been shown in ﬁeld experiments. For instance, in a ﬁeld
study on voluntary donations to social funds at the University of Zurich, Frey and Meier (2004) show that students who are
informed that 64 percent of the other students contributed to the social funds are more likely to contribute than students
who are told that only 46 percent donated to the social funds. Meier (2006) replicates this ﬁnding in a follow-up study.
Rustagi et al. (2010) study forest management groups in Ethiopia and ﬁnd that groups comprising more conditional cooper-9 This sort of evidence has also inﬂuenced theory development. Traxler (2010) provides a theoretical analysis of the implications of conditional coopera- 
tion for tax evasion. For an early theoretical treatment on the importance of perceived tax evasion see Bordignon (1993) . 
10 See e.g., Ockenfels (1999) , Fischbacher et al. (2001) , Falk and Fischbacher (2002) , Kurzban and Houser (2005) , Muller et al. (2008) , Kocher et al. (2008) , 
Herrmann and Thöni (2009) , Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) , Fischbacher et al. (2012) , Thöni et al. (2012) , Volk et al. (2012) , Martinsson et al. (2013) , 
Kocher et al. (2015) , Cubitt et al. (2017) , Gächter et al. (2017) , Weber et al. (2018) and Albrecht et al. (2018) . Chaudhuri (2011) provides a survey of this 
literature and Thöni and Volk (2018) a synthesis of the distribution of types across many studies. 
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 ators are also more successful in managing their forest commons. For further examples, see e.g., Croson and Shang (2008) ,
Martin and Randal (2008) , Alpizar et al. (2008) , Chen et al. (2010) , Jack and Recalde (2015) and Dur and Vollaard (2015) . 
In summary, naturally occurring ﬁeld evidence as well as lab and ﬁeld experiments in environments that have features
of social dilemmas suggest that people behave more pro-socially the more they believe others do so too. It follows from
this observation that any factor that shifts beliefs will shift behavior. Leaders, whose behavior is visible to followers, are in
a particularly powerful position to inﬂuence their followers’ beliefs. Our main contribution in this paper is to investigate the
belief-shifting effect of leaders, which previous literature has not investigated. Therefore, we chose a leader-follower public
goods game, which we detail in the next section, as one framework for our analysis. Since belief effects also matter in the
absence of leaders, which characterizes many of the situations discussed above, we also look at belief effects in a public
goods game without a leader. 
3. Design and procedures 
Our basic design involves a linear public goods game. Each of the four team members has to decide on how many of
20 tokens to keep and how many tokens to contribute to a team project. For simplicity, the size of the team project is just
the sum of all contributions to it. The payoff for each subject is given by: 
πi = 20 − g i + 0 . 4 
4 ∑ 
j=1 
g j . (1)
From (1) it is obvious that a rational and selﬁsh individual has an incentive to free ride on the other group member’s
contributions (i.e., to choose g i = 0). A social dilemma arises, since it is in the joint interest of the group to contribute the
whole amount to the team project but individual incentives are to contribute nothing. 
The leader game is a simple variation of this standard public goods game. One randomly selected group member – who
we will henceforth call the ‘leader’ – decides ﬁrst in his or her team. We selected the leader randomly, to avoid a confound
with leader attributes (see footnote 2). The other three group members (called the ‘followers’) learn about the leader’s
contribution to the team project and then decide simultaneously about their contributions to the team project. 11 The payoff
functions of all team members, including the leader’s, are identical and equal to (1) . The presence of a leader does not
change incentives to free ride. 
We have two treatments – a treatment with a leader (the ‘leader treatment’) and a control treatment with no leader
in which group members decided simultaneously (‘no-leader treatment’). The purpose of the leader treatment is to see to
what extent a leader shapes both followers’ beliefs about how others play and their actual contributions. In both treatments,
the relevant game was repeated ten times. Teams remained the same throughout the experiment (‘partners’ design). Length
and team composition were commonly known. A participant took part in one treatment only. 
We follow Gächter and Renner (2010) in how we elicited and incentivized beliefs. We elicited beliefs in each round of the
game, on the same screen where subjects also made their contribution decisions. 12 Speciﬁcally, in the no-leader treatment
we asked participants to estimate the average of the other players’ contributions. In the leader treatment, we asked the
leader about his or her estimate of how many tokens the three followers would contribute on average; each follower had to
submit his or her estimate of the average contribution of the two other followers after having seen the leader’s contribution.
We paid subjects 20 money units in every case where a participant estimated the actual contribution of others exactly right
( ±0.5 tokens); and 10 money units/(absolute) estimation error if their estimate deviated by more than ±0.5 tokens from the
actual contribution. 
We conducted all experiments with z-Tree ( Fischbacher, 2007 ) in the laboratory at the University of Erfurt (eLab). Our
participants were 96 undergraduates from various disciplines; 48 participated in the leader treatment and 48 in the no-
leader treatment. In total, we have thus observations from 24 independent groups of four subjects. 
The participants were randomly assigned to the booths in the laboratory at the beginning of each session. The booths
separated the participants visually and ensured that every individual made his or her decision anonymously and indepen-
dently. The written instructions (see online supplementary materials) explained the above social dilemma situation and the
experimental procedures. We assigned the groups randomly and anonymously, such that participants did not know which
of the other participants were in their group. Participants had to answer a set of control questions to ensure that every par-
ticipant understood the decision problem. We did not start the experiment before all participants had answered all control
questions correctly. Subjects were paid anonymously in cash immediately after each session. Our experiments lasted 30 min
on average, and participants earned €6.00. 11 In the experiment, we never talked of leaders and followers, but instead of the participant that decides ﬁrst in his or her group. See the instructions 
in the online supplementary materials for further details. 
12 Another possibility would have been to ask for beliefs on a separate screen. We decided against this. Subjects were told about beliefs in the instructions 
and they also knew that the game with belief elicitation was repeated ten times. Hence, subjects knew that their beliefs would be elicited and therefore 
it was easier (and faster) to do it on the same screen. Also, because beliefs are of central importance for our research question, we decided to incentivize 
beliefs despite the possibility of some hedging with contributions ( Blanco et al., 2010 ). Although eliciting incentivized beliefs might affect cooperation levels 
( Croson, 20 0 0; Gächter and Renner, 2010 ), we believe, however, that it is a minor issue here because we elicited incentivized beliefs in both treatments. 
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 4. Results 
We proceed in three steps. We ﬁrst investigate how leaders shape followers’ beliefs and contrast belief formation with a
leader with belief formation without a leader. In the second step, we compare the link between beliefs and contributions in
the leader and the no-leader treatment. In the third step, we investigate the extent to which leaders do prevent the decline
of cooperation expected in the no-leader treatment. 
4.1. Determinants of beliefs 
We start with the impact of the leaders’ decision on followers’ beliefs. Fig. 1 records our main ﬁnding. The x -axis depicts
the leaders’ contribution and the y -axis records the followers’ average belief or contribution, respectively. We distinguish
between periods. The left panel shows the ﬁrst period in which the followers have not yet observed any follower decisions.
Leaders in the ﬁrst period contributed 5, 10, 12, 15 or 20 tokens. Higher leader contributions trigger higher beliefs of fol-
lowers about the other follower’s contributions. Moreover, on average followers very closely match their beliefs with their
actual contributions. Thus, leaders shape the belief of followers and appear to be role models for them. 
The middle panel looks at the tenth period. This period is interesting, because it is the last one and hence there is no
strategic reason to match the leader’s contribution. Yet, we observe that the followers’ beliefs about other followers’ contri-
butions increase highly signiﬁcantly in the leaders’ contributions. The followers also match their beliefs; that is, followers are
conditional cooperators on average. This result is consistent with previous ﬁndings on conditional cooperation (see footnote
10 for references). The ﬁnal panel records the evidence over all periods. We ﬁnd that both the followers’ beliefs and con-
tributions are positively correlated with the leader’s contributions. All correlations also hold at the group level (Spearman
rank order correlations, n = 12, all p < 0.017 with group averages as independent observations). 
While the main insights are conveyed in Fig. 1 and the above-mentioned non-parametric correlations, some additional
insights might be gained from an econometric analysis. Table 1 investigates the determinants of beliefs econometrically. We
use OLS and calculate robust standard errors using the group as the independent clustering unit (this assumes that deci-
sions are correlated within a group but independent across groups). Speciﬁcally, we estimate a belief formation model as
developed by Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) in the context of a ten times repeated public good experiment with random
matching. 13 Fischbacher and Gächter show that a subject’s belief in period t about the other group members’ average con-
tribution in period t can be described as a weighted average of the belief a subject held in period t – 1 and what the other
group members actually contributed on average in period t – 1. 
Table 1 documents the results of Fischbacher and Gächter’s belief formation model in our data set. 14 Panel A presents
the no-leader treatment . Looking at the data from all periods, we ﬁnd, like Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) , that beliefs in
period t are a weighted average of own beliefs in period t – 1 and average actual contributions of others in period t – 1. 15 
When forming their estimates about the likely contributions of others, subjects put a weight of one third on their own
previous belief and about a weight of two thirds on the observed average contribution of others in the previous period. The13 Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) also had groups of four subjects (but randomly re-matched them in each period) and the same payoff function (1) as 
the present experiment. See their paper for further details on the belief formation model and Smith (2013) for a general analysis of belief effects in public 
goods. 
14 As mentioned, we clustered at the group level, which leaves us with 12 independent clusters in each regression. This might be considered low by some 
(e.g., Cameron and Miller, 2015 ), with the concern that estimated standard errors are biased downwards; non-clustered (heteroscedasticity robust) standard 
errors might be more conservative. Random effects regressions with robust standard errors ﬁnd that this is not the case: estimated robust standard errors 
are mostly lower than with the group-clustered standard errors we report in Table 1 . All statistically signiﬁcant results reported in Table 1 are robust to 
the calculation of standard errors. 
15 An F-test does not allow rejecting the null hypotheses that the sum of coeﬃcients “Own beliefs in t – 1” and “Others’ average contributions in t – 1”
is one ( p = 0.136). 
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Table 1 
Determinants of beliefs in the absence (Panel A) and presence of a leader (Panel B) . 
A. No-leader treatment 
Beliefs about other group members’ contribution in t 
ALL periods Periods 2–5 Periods 6–10 
Own belief in t – 1 0.329 ∗∗∗ 0.310 ∗∗∗ 0.338 ∗∗∗
(0.067) (0.097) (0.042) 
Average contribution of other group members in t – 1 0.629 ∗∗∗ 0.619 ∗∗∗ 0.624 ∗∗∗
(0.058) (0.076) (0.045) 
Constant 0.461 0.972 0.305 
(0.325) (0.542) (0.247) 
Observations 432 192 240 
R-squared 0.82 0.73 0.85 
B. Leader treatment 
Beliefs of followers about other follower’s contribution in t 
ALL periods Periods 2–5 Periods 6–10 
Leader contribution in t 0.373 ∗∗∗ 0.477 ∗∗∗ 0.290 ∗∗∗
(0.090) (0.121) (0.070) 
Own belief in t – 1 0.087 ∗∗∗ 0.005 0.138 ∗∗
(0.028) (0.050) (0.059) 
Average contribution of other followers in t – 1 0.519 ∗∗∗ 0.437 ∗∗∗ 0.566 ∗∗∗
(0.074) (0.095) (0.060) 
Constant 0.010 0.828 −0.111 
(0.604) (1.033) (0.407) 
Observations 432 192 240 
R-squared 0.86 0.80 0.90 
OLS; robust standard errors clustered on groups in parentheses; ∗∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1%. The estimation of the No-leader 
treatment follows Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 estimation results are robust to including period as an explanatory variable, which is only weakly signiﬁcantly negative (co-
eff= −0.065; p=0.057). Splitting up the data in ﬁrst half (periods 2–5) and second half (periods 6–10) shows no systematic
change in the belief formation process. 
In the leader treatment (Panel B) beliefs can be shaped by the leader’s current contribution, the followers’ previous con-
tributions, and the follower’s beliefs in t – 1 about others’ contributions. Starting with the results from all periods, we ﬁnd
again that beliefs are a weighted average of all three variables, which are all highly signiﬁcant. 16 In the presence of a leader
the importance of own beliefs in t – 1 is largely diminished (although still highly signiﬁcant). The important variables are
the leader’s contribution and the other followers’ past contributions. An increase of a leader’s contribution by one token
increases the followers’ average belief by 0.373 tokens. The impact of others’ average contribution on follower beliefs is
substantially higher: a one token increase in others’ average contribution in t – 1 increases the followers’ average belief by
0.519 tokens. In this sense, the followers’ past contributions are more important for the beliefs about contributions of other
followers in the current period than the leader’s contribution in the current period. Again, results are robust to controlling
for period (coeff= −0.063, p = 0.109). 
Splitting the data in the ﬁrst and second half (periods 2–5 and 6–10, respectively) reveals an interesting change in the
weight the leader’s contribution receives for forming beliefs about the other followers’ contribution. Initially, followers’ be-
liefs are a weighted average of the leader’s contribution and the other followers’ contribution in the previous period, with
weights being very similar (0.477 and 0.437, respectively) and own beliefs in the previous period being unimportant. This
picture changes in the second half, where the weight of the leader’s contribution is diminished (to 0.290) and own past
belief (0.138) and others’ past contribution (0.566) becoming more important. 
The observation that the other followers’ past behavior is more important for beliefs than the leader’s current behavior
leads to a ‘path dependency effect’. From Fig. 1 and Table 1 B we know that the leader’s contribution shapes the followers’
initial beliefs and actual contributions very strongly. Yet, in subsequent periods the followers’ belief of what happens in the
current period depends more strongly on what the other followers have done in the past than what the leader just did in
the present period. Thus, the direct contemporaneous impact of the leader is diminished relative to the weight that followers
attach to the other followers’ past behavior when forming their beliefs about the likely behavior of other followers in the
present period. In other words, the impact of a leader’s contribution is strongest in the ﬁrst periods and, while playing
a role in subsequent periods, it is not strong enough to correct the beliefs of followers once they can observe the actual
contributions of followers in the later periods. 16 An F-test conﬁrms that the sum of coeﬃcients is insigniﬁcantly different from unity ( p = 0.510). 
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Fig. 2. Contributions as a function of the beliefs about other group members’ contribution in games with and without a leader. 
Table 2 
Cooperation in the presence and absence of a leader. 
Dependent variable: No-leader treatment Leader treatment 
Contribution Follower contribution 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Leader contribution in t 0.115 0.081 
(0.085) (0.048) 
Belief about others’ average contribution in t 0.887 ∗∗∗ 0.494 ∗∗∗ 0.918 ∗∗∗ 0.641 ∗∗∗ 0.820 ∗∗∗ 0.577 ∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.087) (0.072) (0.085) (0.124) (0.110) 
Own contribution in t – 1 0.523 ∗∗∗ 0.361 ∗∗∗ 0.356 ∗∗∗
(0.080) (0.091) (0.087) 
Constant 0.738 −0.571 0.054 −0.707 −0.215 −0.889 
(0.787) (0.327) (0.574) (0.231) (0.509) (0.245) 
Observations 480 432 360 324 360 324 
R-squared 0.40 0.57 0.59 0.67 0.59 0.67 
OLS; robust standard errors clustered on groups in parentheses. ∗∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4.2. The link between beliefs and contributions 
Our next step is to understand how beliefs in period t and contributions in period t are linked . Fig. 2 documents the
results. On the x -axis we depict the belief about others’ contributions and on the y -axis we show the average actual contri-
bution. We distinguish between the two treatments. We ﬁnd strong evidence for conditional cooperation in both treatments.
Moreover, average contribution behavior conditional on given beliefs is virtually identical between treatments. 17 Thus, the
presence of a leader has not altered conditionally cooperative behavior in any substantial sense. A further interesting obser-
vation is that in both treatments players match their beliefs almost perfectly with their contributions. Moreover, beliefs and
contributions follow the diagonal very closely. 
Again, an econometric analysis of the link between contributions and beliefs might provide some additional insights
beyond these main observations. 18 In Table 2 we distinguish between the no-leader treatment and the leader treatment. For
both treatments, we run two OLS regression models with robust standard errors clustered on independent groups. 
In the ﬁrst model (columns (1) and (3)) we only include the belief about others’ average contribution in period t as a
regressor. We ﬁnd that in both treatments the estimated coeﬃcients are around 0.9 and are highly signiﬁcant. 
In our second set of models (columns (2) and (4)) we include the own contribution in t – 1 as an explanatory variable.
The reason is that people might follow an idiosyncratic contribution pattern, which we capture by this variable. We ﬁnd in17 These results also hold at group level. Group-level pairs of belief-contribution observations (averaged over all periods) are distributed very closely 
around the diagonal. Spearman rank correlations are 0.99 ( p < 0.001) both for the no-leader and the leader treatment. 
18 The caveat about the number of clusters mentioned in footnote 14 also holds here. However, like with the re-estimated results of Table 1 , we also 
ﬁnd for Table 2 that in random effects regressions with robust standard errors estimated standard errors are mostly lower than with the group-clustered 
standard errors. Like in Table 1 , none of the statistically signiﬁcant results reported in Table 2 change upon re-estimation. 
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Fig. 3. The impact of a group’s ﬁrst-period contribution on the group cooperation level in the remaining periods in the absence (left) and presence of a 
leader (right). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 both models that own lagged contributions matter strongly both in terms of size and signiﬁcance. An interesting observation
is that the belief about others’ average contribution matters somewhat more in the leader treatment than in the no-leader
treatment; for the variable ‘own contribution in t – 1’ the opposite conclusion holds. 
Finally, in our third set of models (columns (5) and (6)), we also include the leader’s contribution to test for direct
reciprocation of the leader’s contribution on top of beliefs about other followers’ contributions (which are also inﬂuenced
by leader contributions). Interestingly, in both models the leader’s contribution only insigniﬁcantly positively related to the
followers’ contributions. Followers only match what they believe other followers are going to contribute. This means that,
although the leader strongly shapes their followers’ beliefs about other followers’ contributions, the leader’s contribution
does not matter on top of follower’s beliefs. 19 This result also holds if we only look at the ﬁrst and second half of periods,
respectively. 
In Section 4.1 we established a path dependency for beliefs. The strong relationship between beliefs and contributions
implies a strong path dependency not only for contributions in the leader treatment but also in the no-leader treatment
because beliefs on others’ average contribution matter strongly in this treatment as well. Fig. 3 illustrates this path depen-
dency at the group level. Each data point in Fig. 3 is an independent group of four members. We depict on the x -axis the
mean contribution in period 1. On the y -axis we show the mean contribution of an independent group for the rest of the
periods. 
We see that in both the no-leader and the leader treatment period 1 group average contributions are signiﬁcantly pos-
itively correlated with group average contributions for periods 2 to 10. The slope of the trend line is almost unity in both
treatments. The between-group variance is higher in the leader treatment than in the no-leader treatment (compare the
R 2 ’s). 
In period 1 of the no-leader treatment contributions were determined by group members’ beliefs about others’ average
contributions, without any information how other group members decided. In the leader treatment, the leader’s contribution
shaped the mean contribution in period 1 (see Fig. 1 ). Thus, the main difference between treatments is that it is on average
largely in the hand of the leader to determine the fate of his or her group in the leader treatment. 
4.3. Can leaders increase contribution levels? 
Given our results so far, a natural question to ask is whether leaders are able to lead their groups to high cooperation and
hence high proﬁt levels. Figs. 1 and 2 and their supporting analysis suggest yes, and Spearman rank correlations between
group average leader contributions and group average follower contributions (averaged over all ten rounds) support this
conclusion ( n = 12; ρ = 0.697; p = 0.012); the same holds for the correlation between group average leader contribution and
group average earnings ( n = 12; ρ = 0.792; p = 0.002). However, these results do not answer the question whether leaders are
able to prevent the decline of cooperation that typically aﬄicts groups when contributions to the public good are determined
simultaneously (e.g., Keser and van Winden, 20 0 0; Herrmann et al., 20 08; Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010; Gächter et al.,19 We also estimated SUR regressions that simultaneously estimate follower’s contributions as a function of follower’s beliefs about other followers’ 
contribution as well as followers’ beliefs as a function of the Leader’s contribution. We ran these regressions for period 1, period 10, and over all periods. 
In all regressions, the leader’s contribution is highly signiﬁcantly positively related with followers’ beliefs, and followers’ beliefs are highly signiﬁcant for 
followers’ contribution. This explains why the leader’s contribution does not matter on top of beliefs. 
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Fig. 4. The leader’s curse and its consequences for beliefs and contributions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2017 ). Our results so far suggest that leaders should be able to lead their groups to higher contribution levels than those
achieved by groups without a leader. Yet, our experiments suggest that the presence of a leader is of no avail. 
Fig. 4 a–c illustrate this sobering result. Fig. 4 a and b show the results in the leader treatment. We distinguish between
beliefs and actual contributions and depict these variables for both leaders ( Fig. 4 a) and followers ( Fig. 4 b, which also in-
cludes the leader contributions for ease of comparison). There is an interesting, though small, difference between leaders
and followers: leaders behave as almost perfect conditional cooperators who contribute the amount they believe the fol-
lowers will contribute, or even more (in particular towards the end). 20 Followers’ contributions fall short of their beliefs in
almost all periods (the difference is 0.72 tokens on average). Followers free ride even more on the leader’s contribution by
contributing on average 1.63 tokens less than the leader. 21 This constitutes the ‘leader’s curse’: leaders are ‘suckers’. Ap-
parently, leaders alleviate the adverse feeling of being suckered by withdrawing their contributions over time; although, in
periods 7 to 10 their contributions exceed their beliefs, which suggests that they make the conscious choice to contribute
more despite expecting followers to free ride. 
Fig. 4 c shows the mean beliefs about others’ average contributions and the average actual contributions in the no-leader
treatment. Beliefs follow contributions closely, although actual contributions fall slightly below expected contributions. There
is a downward trend in both variables, which is expected given previous results – see Neugebauer et al. (2009), Fischbacher
and Gächter (2010), Bayer et al. (2013) and Gächter et al. (2017) . 20 Recall that leaders where allocated randomly and so it is likely that some of them are actually free rider types, that is, not motivated by conditional 
cooperation. This is likely, given an abundance of evidence showing that people differ strongly in their social preferences ( Blanco et al., 2011; Beranek 
et al., 2015 ) and cooperative disposition (see references in footnote 10). However, our experimental design does not allow us to disentangle motivations 
(cooperative dispositions) and behavior; we only observe the leader’s behavior. See Gächter et al. (2012) for an analysis that disentangles leaders’ coopera- 
tive dispositions and their actual leader behavior. They ﬁnd that leaders with cooperative dispositions are the better leaders in the sense that they achieve 
higher levels of cooperation and earnings than leaders with free rider dispositions. 
21 Linear regressions with robust standard errors clustered by group support these claims: (1) A regression of leader contributions on leader beliefs and 
period returns a coeﬃcient on beliefs of 0.955 ( p < 0.001); the constant and period are insigniﬁcant ( p = 0.928 and 0.208, resp.). (2) The same regression 
for follower contributions on their beliefs and period returns a coeﬃcient on beliefs of 0.917 ( p < 0.001); period and constant are insigniﬁcant ( p > 0.903). 
(3) A regression of contributions on a leader dummy and period shows that the average of 1.65 tokens per round is marginally insigniﬁcant ( p = 0.105); the 
coeﬃcient on period (-0.447) and the constant (11.69) are signiﬁcant ( p = 0.026 and p < 0.001, resp.). 
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 The results from Fig. 4 a–c explain why a comparison of group average contributions in the no-leader treatment (10.24)
and the leader-treatment (9.64), illustrated in Fig. 4 d, shows no signiﬁcant difference. 22 Because leaders are conditional
cooperators too, and followers tend to free ride to some extent on the leader’s contributions, leaders are unwilling to uphold
high levels of contribution and hence to lead their groups to higher contribution levels than those achieved by groups with
no leaders. 
5. Summary and concluding discussion 
In this paper, we analyzed the role of beliefs about other’s behavior for own pro-social behavior. As we showed in
Section 2 , there is plenty of anecdotal and scientiﬁc evidence from the ﬁeld and the lab that suggests a link between beliefs
and pro-social behavior. If people’s pro-social behavior is belief-dependent, any factor that shifts people’s beliefs will shift
their behavior. In this paper, we looked at leaders as a potentially strong belief-shifters and compared the leader-setting to
a setup without a leader (our ‘no-leader treatment’). 
Our most important results are as follows. In both treatments, we ﬁnd strong belief effects: the higher the beliefs, the
higher are contributions. Moreover, for a given belief, contributions are identical between treatments. We ﬁnd strong path
dependency effects in both treatments: groups that start at high (low) cooperation maintain high (low) cooperation. In
our no-leader treatment beliefs and contributions only depend on other group member’s past contributions. In the leader
treatment leading by example works in the sense that leaders shape the followers’ initial beliefs (and contributions) very
strongly, but from then on followers, in forming their beliefs (and deciding on their contributions) put more weight on
the other followers’ past contributions than on the leader’s current one. This observation implies that the leader’s initial
behavior has long-lasting effects. Finally, we found evidence for a ‘leader’s curse’: although followers follow the leader’s
example and contribute more the more the leader contributes, the leader is nevertheless the ‘sucker’ in this game. As a
consequence, leaders reduce their contributions over time, and cooperation collapses, much like in the no-leader treatment.
We conclude our paper by discussing a few implications of our results for understanding issues in public policy and
management. We begin with our last result, the ‘leader’s curse’. Our ﬁndings suggest that good leaders need to be ‘thick-
skinned’ and accept being ’exploited’. Put differently, good leaders need to resist the temptation to give in if their followers
do not play ball to the extent the leader does. This is diﬃcult, given that many leaders (who are randomly assigned to
their role) are also conditional cooperators who only want to cooperate if others do so too and hence are averse to being
exploited by others ( Cubitt et al., 2017 ); this is even true for people who are not motivated by conditional cooperation
( Weber et al., 2018 ). 
Second, since leaders are role models, the behavior of politicians, top oﬃcials and managers may matter strongly for
the morale of citizens and employees. Thus, our ﬁndings from tightly controlled laboratory experiments underscore the
observations made in our introductory quotes and the ﬁeld evidence we discussed in Section 2 . An interesting new insight
of our laboratory approach is that there is a ‘multiplier effect’, because a bad example (dishonesty in tax matters, corruption,
and unethical behavior in other domains) may not only have direct effects on a follower but may also trigger belief effects
about how others will react. The path-dependency effect may affect morale adversely in the long-run. Leaders should thus
be role models for whom high moral standards should hold. 
An implication of our path dependency result is that leaders have the greatest direct impact of inﬂuencing their followers’
behavior at the beginning of a relationship (see Figs. 1 and 2 ). The fact that later on the impact of leaders on followers’
beliefs is diminished may explain why in reality corporate cultures are hard to change or why tax evasion and corruption
are hard to ﬁght. 
In our view, the behavioral relevance of our ﬁndings extends beyond leadership by speciﬁc individuals. Belief manage-
ment happens not only through leaders, but also through effects like the perceived fairness of the tax system, fair treatment
by authorities, and democratic participation rights. For instance, there is evidence that the perception of the fairness of
the tax system and the treatment by authorities matter for tax morale ( Seidl and Traub, 2001; Pommerehne and Weck-
Hannemann, 1996; Goette and Kucher, 1998; Scholz and Lubell, 1998; Feld and Frey, 2002 ). More generally, tax morale is
signiﬁcantly positively correlated with trust in the parliament and the justice system (e.g., Alm et al., 2006; Frey and Tor-
gler, 2007 ). Similarly, tax morale is positively affected by various governance variables, like political stability, government
effectiveness, rule of law, voice and accountability, regulatory quality and control of corruption ( Frey and Torgler, 2007 ). A
further interesting observation is that tax evasion at the Swiss cantonal level is lower in cantons where citizens have more
direct democratic rights (e.g., Feld and Frey, 2002 ). 
How can our observations explain such ﬁndings? First, with regard to tax morale (similar conclusions may hold for the
abuse of the welfare state and corruption), there may be a direct effect by the concerned individual who may reciprocate
unfair treatment by authorities and/or the tax system by lower tax morale, simply because the taxpayer resents unfair
treatment ( Smith, 1992 ). Second, there may be an indirect effect of tax authorities (and the government in general), via the
beliefs on other tax payers’ behavior. The reason is that if many people share similar feelings and experiences, this will22 A linear regression with robust standard errors clustered on groups of contributions on period and a dummy for the leader treatment returns an 
insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient for the leader treatment dummy ( p = 0.735) and a signiﬁcantly negative coeﬃcient for period (-0.388, p = 0.001). The constant is 
12.37 ( p < 0.001). The lack of a difference in contributions between the leader and the no-leader treatment holds for the ﬁrst and the second half, and 
even for period 1. 
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 lower the belief that others have a high tax morale, which further undermines tax morale. Similarly, the government’s trust
in the honesty of its citizens may lead to a direct effect of “trust breeds trust” ( Feld and Frey, 2002 ), presumably because
people like to be considered trustworthy. Again, if such feelings are widespread, they may shape beliefs about other citizen’s
tax morale and hence reinforce the tax payer’s morale. Direct-democratic procedures may inﬂuence tax morale positively
because direct democracy may affect the beliefs about other people’s tax morale once a tax law is passed in a referendum.
A referendum signals people’s opinion about a topic and the dissemination of opinions via the result of a referendum may
shape people’s beliefs about others’ behavior ( Feld and Tyran, 2002; Stutzer and Lalive, 2004 ). 
Previous research (see Section 2 ) has focused primarily on the direct reciprocity effects mentioned above; indirect effects
(via beliefs) are understudied. Put differently, there is only little evidence on how governments, politicians, and authorities
inﬂuence people’s perceptions on how pro-socially their fellow citizens will behave. We are only aware of one study, by
Hammar et al. (2009) , that investigated indirect effects by looking at the impact of trust in politicians on people’s percep-
tions of tax morale. In conclusion, our results encourage further investigations of belief effects in economically interesting
ﬁeld data. mmc1.pdf 
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